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The human mind is continuously involved in “projecting” the self in time in order to process past
memories and predict future occurrences. “Self-projection” in time involves episodic and spatial
memory, relying on medial-temporal structures, but also engages visuo-spatial imagery, relying on
occipito-temporal mechanisms, and self-location, relying on temporo-parietal activity. Here we had
the rare opportunity to investigate the relation between self-projection in time and memory, using
a novel behavioural paradigm, in a patient with subacute bilateral medial-temporal damage during
a period of amnesia as well as after recovery. Despite her memory deficit the patient was able to
“project” herself to past and future, yet with significant improvement after recovery. These findings
specify the relations between episodic memory and medial-temporal structures with self-projection
in time to past and future.
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A major aspect of the human mind is the ability to
“project” the self in the mental time (MT) in order
to remember the past and to predict the future
(Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Levine, 2004; Tulving,
2002). Self-projection in time is defined as “a
shift of perception from the immediate environ-
ment to the alternative, imagined [past or] future
environment” (Buckner & Carroll, 2007, p. 49Q1 ),
allowing to experience the self as continuous
through MT: to reexperience one’s personal past
through the subjective “projection” of the self to
a specific place and time of a past event, or to
imagine a forward self-location and to preexperi-
ence a future event (Atance & O’Neill, 2001;
Tulving, 2002). MT has classically been related
to memory functions, supposing that memory is
needed not only to retrieve past episodic memories
but also to predict future events (Addis, Wong, &
Schacter, 2007; Atance & O’Neill, 2001;
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Accordingly,
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amnesic patients with medial-temporal lesion have
been found to have deficits not only in retrieval of
past events (Corkin, 2002; Squire, Stark, & Clark,
2004; Zola-Morgan, Squire, & Amaral, 1986), but
also in future prediction (Atance & O’Neill, 2001;
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007a;
Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Tulving, 2002).
In a recent study (Arzy, Molnar-Szakacs, &
Blanke, 2008), we showed that besides episodic
memory, processing of MT also requires the
ability to “project” oneself in time in order to
experience past and future events. In this study
we tested self-projection in time from three differ-
ent self-locations in participants’ life: past, present,
and future (Figure 1A). Using behavioural
measures and electrical neuroimaging we showed
that behaviour and brain activity are similar for
self-projection to past and future self-locations.
Electrical neuroimaging showed self-projection
in time to activate a network of brain areas consist-
ing of the antero-medial temporal cortex, tra-
ditionally related to memory functions (Corkin,
2002; Squire et al., 2004; Zola-Morgan et al.,
1986), together with occipito-temporal cortex
and temporo-parietal cortex, which are related to
visual memory, self-location, and mental own-
body imagery (Addis et al., 2007; Arzy, Thut,
Mohr, Michel, & Blanke, 2006). Based on these
findings of a distributed cortical network encoding
for self-projection in time we hypothesized here
that patients with amnesia due to medial temporal
damage should still be able to project themselves in
time, despite memory impairments. This would be
compatible with partial dissociation between
memory and self-projection in time.Q2
Patient
The patient was a right-handed 54-year-old
woman, with no history of neurological or psychia-
tric disorders, who suffered from voltage gated
potassium channels (VGKC) antibodies associated
limbic encephalitis. Limbic encephalitis is an infl-
ammatory process that is primarily localized in the
limbic system including the medial temporal lobe
bilaterally. Limbic encephalitis has typically been
regarded as a paraneoplastic (malignancy-related)
disorder. However, in recent years a different
form of limbic encephalitis has been identified
that is associated with VGKC-antibodies. This
type may respond to immunotherapy as adminis-
tered in the present patient (Thieben et al.,
2004; Vincent et al., 2004). The patient’s disease
manifested as a short- and long-term memory
loss accompanied by personality changes with no
disorientation in space or time (Table 1). The
neurological examination did not show any sensor-
imotor deficits. The neuropsychological examin-
ation (Table 1) showed disturbance in short-term
memory, working memory, episodic memory,
and semantic memory, but no evidence of confa-
bulation. Her neuropsychiatric evaluation showed
moderate deficits in executive functions, including
marked lability, tangentiality and disinhibition.
No deficits were detected for language, attention,
calculation, topography, or praxis (Table 1).
Cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF) showed high protein
level (92 mg/mm3) and positive oligoclonal bands
compatible with an inflammatory process.
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain
showed enhancement at the anterior and middle-
temporal lobe bilaterally (Figure 2A). Q3Whole body
computed tomography (CT) scan, positron emission
tomography with fluorodeoxyglucose (PET-FDG),
and mammography did not show any neoplasm.
Immunological and paraneoplastic biomarkers in
blood and CSF were negative, but antibodies for
VGKC were found to be positive. The patient was
treated with high-dose corticosteroids and plasma
exchange. Under treatment her condition was
gradually improved. Three months after treatment
initiation she was able to manage again her own
business, with memory functions progressively
recovering (Table 1). There were no signs of lability,
tangentiality, and disinhibition. MRI demonstrated
almost a complete disappearance of the above-
mentioned signal enhancement (Figure 1B).
We tested self-projection in time during hospi-
talization and three months after initiation of
immunomodulatory treatment. Written informed
consent was obtained prior to inclusion in the
study from the patient and her family. The
patient and 7 age- and gender-matched control
participants (mean+ SD, 53+ 4 years) with
2 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, 0000, 00 (0)
ARZY, BICK, BLANKE
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
150
155
160
165
170
175
180
similar socio-economic and educational back-
ground as the patient were presented with differ-
ent events that were taken from self-related
personal history (e.g., first child, silver anniversary)
or from non-self-related world occurrences (e.g.,
Challenger explosion, hurricane Katrina;
Figure 1A). Events were taken from the list of
general events used previously (Arzy et al., 2008)
Figure 1. (A) Stimuli and procedure of the MT-task (MT ¼ mental time). The three different self-locations in time—past, now, and
future—are shown. Participants were asked to mentally “project” themselves to one of these self-locations and to judge whether different
self- or non-self-related events (see, e.g., in upper row) had already happened (relative past) or were yet to happen (relative future). (B)
Patient medial-temporal damage and performance before and after recovery. Sagittal T2-FLAIR (fluid-attenuated inversion recovery)
section MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) of the patient before treatment (upper row) showing bilateral inflammatory lesion at the
medial temporal region, almost completely disappearing three months after treatment initiation (lower row). The bar diagrams show
reaction times (left) and error rates (right) of the patient in the MT-task. Note the shorter reaction times for the now self-location than
for past and future. Asterisks and lines on the bars show results (mean + SD) for an age- and gender-matched control group. To view
a colour version of this figure, please see the online issue of the Journal. Q2
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and were adapted to the patient according to her
past history and plans as were obtained at admis-
sion and during neuropsychological testing, as
well as by complementary information from
family members. Stimuli appeared for 1,000 ms
in the centre of the computer screen with an inter-
stimulus interval of 2,000 ms. Judgements were
given using index and middle fingers of the left
and right hand in alternating blocks as a button
press on a serial response box. Patient and
control participants were instructed to respond as
quickly and precisely as possible while maintaining
a mental image of themselves in the appropriate
temporal self-location (past, now, or future); this
was performed in three blocks. Each block
included 60 stimuli, equally distributed among
four groups: self-related (personal events) in rela-
tive past, self-related in relative future, non-self-
related (world events) in relative past, and non-
self-related in relative future, appearing in
random order. Stimuli were presented, and reac-
tion time and accuracy were recorded, using
Table 1. Neuropsychological findings before treatment initiation and three months after
Test
Before After
Score Impairment Score Impairment
Rey Auditory–Verbal Learning Test
Learning 33/75 Severe 54/75 Percentile 40
Discriminability 11/15 Severe–moderate 15/15 Percentile 90
Delayed recall 5/15 Severe 9/15 Percentile 10
Rey Visual Learning Test
Trial 1 7/15 Severe–moderate 12/15 Mild
Trial 2 6/15 Severe-moderate 12/15 Mild
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination
Orientation 10/10 — 10/10 —
Attention & Concentration 8/8 — 8/8 —
Memory 1 3/3 — 3/3 —
Memory 2 Trial 1 4/7 Moderate 5/7 Mild
Trial 2 5/7 Moderate 7/7 —
Trial 3 6/7 Mild 7/7 —
5-Min Delayed Recall 7/7 — 7/7 —
20-Min Delayed Recall 6/7 Mild 7/7 —
Retrograde Memory 1/4 Severe 4/4 —
Verbal Fluency–Animals (scaled score) 5/7 Moderate 6/7 Mild
Verbal Fluency–Letters (scaled score) 6/7 Mild 6/7 Mild
Naming 11/12 Mild 12/12 —
Language Comprehension 8/8 — 8/8 —
Repetition 5/5 — 5/5 —
Reading 2/2 — 2/2 —
Writing 1/1 — 1/1 —
Visual Spatial/Praxis 5/5 — 5/5 —
Total score 86/100 Mild–moderate 96/100
Frontal Assessment Battery 15/18 Mild 18/18 —
Cookie Theft 2/2 — 2/2 —
Map Reading 7/7 — 7/7 —
Benton Facial Recognition 37/50 Moderate 45/50
Attention and Concentration
20–1 0 error — 0 error —
ABC 0 error — 0 error —
Serial threes 0 error — 0 error —
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E-Primew software (Schneider, Eschman, &
Zuccolotto, 2002). Patient and, accordingly, con-
trols were asked first to judge from their present
self-location in time (now) whether these events
had already happened (relative past) or were yet
to happen (relative future). They were then
asked to imagine themselves 15 years younger
(past self-location) or older (future self-location)
and to make the same judgements (Figure 1A).
In each block (past, now, and future), patient
and controls were repeatedly instructed in the
beginning of each session to imagine themselves
in a specific past, present, or future time and
from this time point to make “relative-past” or
“relative-future” judgements about the presented
events. While the explicit measurement relates to
relative past versus relative future, the task
implicitly measures self-projection in time, which
is the main interest in the present patient.
Subsequent to the experiment patient and controls
were asked to note for each event how long ago
this event took place (for past events) or in how
many years it was supposed to happen. These
responses were used to quantify the degree of
memory impairment (percentage of mistaken or
missing responses), as well as to determine
correct responses for each participant. Patient
responses were verified according to complemen-
tary anamnesis by family members. While
control participants could recall 100% of both
self- and non-self-related events, the patient,
before treatment initiation, could explicitly recall
78% of the self-related events and 31% of the
non-self-related events. Three months after treat-
ment initiation the patient showed important
recovery and recalled all self-related events and
68% of the non-self-related events (for further
neuropsychological details see Table 1).
The patient was tested with the above-
described MT-task before treatment initiation
and three months afterwards. Testing before
treatment initiation showed that reaction times
in past and future self-locations were significantly
higher than those in the now (MT effect: past,
2,334+ 60 ms; now, 1,841+ 47 ms; future,
2,056+ 63 ms). A similar pattern was found in
an age- and gender-matched control group
(Figure 1B, upper row). Behavioural results also
showed an effect of self (self-related faster than
non-self-related events: self-related, 1,890 +
59 ms; non-self-related, 2,227 + 63 ms), as was
found also in the control group. Error rates also
showed both effects (MT effect: past, 29%; now,
9%; future, 21%; self effect: self-related, 14%;
non-self-related, 24%). Testing three months
after treatment showed effects of MT (past,
1,947 + 60 ms; now, 1,589 + 42 ms; future,
1,739 + 66 ms) and self (self-related, 1,643 +
56 ms; non-self-related, 1,939 + 59 ms), com-
parable to repeated testing in the control group
(Figure 1B, lower row). Error rates also showed
both effects (MT: past, 26%; now, 19%; future,
20%; self: self-related, 19%; non-self-related,
24%). Statistical analysis of reaction times
showed main effects of treatment, before and
after, F(1, 3) ¼ 82.4, p , .001, MT, F(2, 6) ¼
230.7, p, .001, and self, F(1, 3) ¼ 37.9, p,
.01, with an interaction only for Recovery 
MT, F(2, 6) ¼ 19.9, p, .005 (see appendices
for more statistical and post hoc tests). Statistical
analysis of reaction times for the control group
showed effects of MT, F(2, 12) ¼ 12.7, p, .01,
and self, F(1, 6) ¼ 4.6, p, .05, with no effect of
repeated testing, F(1, 6) ¼ 0.5, p ¼ .48. Similar
results were found for error rates: MT, F(2, 12)
¼ 4.0, p , .05; self, F(1, 6) ¼ 29.1, p, .01;
repeated testing, F(1, 6) ¼ 0.4, p ¼ .8. Finally, in
order to exclude a mental calculation strategy to
account for our results we checked 5 additional
participants in the MT-task, yet asking them to
use mental calculation strategy and not self-projec-
tion in time. None of these participants was able to
perform the task in the given interstimulus interval
of 2,000 ms. In addition, patient (after recovery)
and controls showed a tendency to be faster for
future events than for past events. Taken together,
these results show that mental calculation cannot
account for the behavioural results recorded in
the MT-task.
Discussion
Patients with amnesia suffer from a disturbance in
acquiring new memories (anterograde amnesia) or
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recall past memories (retrograde amnesia), gener-
ally attributed to medial temporal lesions
(Corkin, 2002; Squire et al., 2004; Zola-Morgan
et al., 1986), compatible with the current patient’s
symptoms and brain damage. Here we investigated
the relation between memory and self-projection
in time in an amnesic patient. We report the fol-
lowing novel observations: (a) preservation of
self-projection in time in amnesia; (b) similar be-
havioural results for self-projection in time to
past and future in amnesia; (c) difference in per-
formance of self-projection in time with and
without amnesia. These observations are discussed
with respect to the role of medial temporal struc-
tures and other brain regions in episodic memory
and self-projection in time.
A central component in processing of MT is
the ability to project the self forward in time to
preexperience an event and to project the self back-
ward to reexperience it. This is supposed to be
related to episodic memory, as the system that
allows us to remember personally experienced
events and to reexperience those events (Atance
& O’Neill, 2001; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner,
2007). It also requires self-location mechanisms
orienting the self on a time-line and with respect
to these events (Arzy et al., 2008; Bird &
Burgess, 2008; Burgess, Becker, King, &
O’Keefe, 2001; Moscovitch et al., 2005; Spreng,
Mar, & Kim, 2008).
The medial temporal region is the most crucial
structure in acquiring both semantic and episodic
memory, and damage to this region might cause
amnesia (Corkin, 2002; Squire et al., 2004; Zola-
Morgan et al., 1986). However, self-projection in
time has been shown previously to rely not only
on memory-related structures in the antero-
medial temporal lobe, but also on structures in
occipito-temporal cortex related to visual
memory (Addis et al., 2007; Arzy et al., 2008)
and structures in temporo-parietal cortex related
to mental own-body imagery and self-location
(Arzy et al., 2008; Levine, 2004). We hypothesize
that these brain regions outside the medial tem-
poral lobe that were not affected in the patient
might also contribute to her ability to project
herself in time despite of her antero-medial
cortex deficit. This hypothesis is also supported
by the dissociation between the ability to recall
events (declarative memory) and to refer to these
memories (nondeclarative memory); in medial
temporal damage, the former is mostly impaired,
showing the role of the medial temporal lobe in
declarative rather then nondeclarative memory
(Corkin, 2002; Squire et al., 2004; Zola-Morgan
et al., 1986). Self-projection in time might be
related to nondeclarative memory, relying on
extratemporal mechanisms, and this might
explain the preservation of our patient’s ability to
solve the MT-task, although she was only partially
able to explicitly recall the same events. This is also
supported by the fact that memory for non-self-
related world occurrences, which probably relies
on a functions other than episodic and semantic
memories, was much worse than memory for
self-related events prior to treatment.
There was a significant difference in self-pro-
jection in time before and after the patient’s recov-
ery, as was also shown by a significant interaction
between these two factors. Although we cannot
exclude that this improvement is related to unspe-
cific mechanisms (such as difficulty, fatigue, lack of
concentration, or “test–retest” effect), we do not
think that this is very likely because the patient
was well motivated and responded during both
test phases, and none of our control participants
showed comparable test–retest effects. In addi-
tion, three months elapsed between both tests for
patient and controls. Moreover, other memory
tasks also showed improvement after recovery,
but this was not observed for attention, language,
or visuospatial tasks (Table 1). We would rather
suggest that self projection in time relies on
distributed neural network, in which the antero-
medial temporal cortex also plays a role. This func-
tion might be related to its above-mentioned role
in episodic and semantic memory (Corkin, 2002;
Squire et al., 2004; Zola-Morgan et al., 1986),
but also to its role in imagining experiences
through the provision of spatial context of the
events (Bird & Burgess, 2008; Burgess et al.,
2001; Burgess, Maguire, & O’Keefe, 2002;
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007b;
Moscovitch et al., 2005; Spreng et al., 2008), or
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“scene construction”, involving the generation,
maintenance, and visualization of complex spatial
contexts (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007), which has
also been shown to be critically reliant on the hip-
pocampus and wider medial temporal lobe
(Hassabis et al., 2007a, 2007b).
In conclusion, this study supplies causal evi-
dence that bilateral medial-temporal damage,
although impairing memory functions, does not
demolish the ability to mentally project the self
to different self-locations in time, in past,
present, or future. This ability was similar with
respect to past and future before and after recovery.
However, this “self-projection” was much faster
after recovery, showing a partial contribution of
medial temporal lobe mechanisms to self-projec-
tion in time. These findings contribute to under-
standing self-projection in time and its neural
bases, and to segregating the brain mechanisms
of episodic memory and temporal self-location in
health and disease.
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APPENDIX A
Interactions and post hoc tests (Newman–
Keuls) for patient’s performance
Effect Variables F p
Interaction Treatment  Self 0.75 .45
MT  Self 0.80 .49Q6
Treatment  MT  Self 5.6 , .05Q7
Treatment Past Before vs. after ,.05
Now Before vs. after ,.05
Future Before vs. after ,.05
MT Before Past vs. now ,.05
Now vs. future ,.05
Past vs. future .4
After Past vs. now ,.05
Now vs. future ,.05
Past vs. future .7
Note: MT ¼ mental time.
APPENDIX B
Interactions and post hoc tests for controls’
performance
Effect Variables F p
Interaction Treatment  Self 0.6 .47
MT  Self 3.3 .08
Treatment  MT  Self 0.22 .8 Q6
Repeated test Past Before vs. after .9
Now Before vs. after .8
Future Before vs. after .8
MT Before Past vs. now , .05 Q7
Now vs. future , . 05
Past vs. future .5
After Past vs. now ,.05
Now vs. future ,.05
Past vs. future .6
Note: MT ¼ mental time.
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